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The State and the Market: An Institutionalist and Relational Take
*
 
 
State-market relations call for a holistic view of the relationship between the material and 
relational dynamics of society, on the one hand, and between these dynamics and institutional 
dynamics on the other. As the institution-of-institutions, the state contains mechanisms that 
are essential to the existence of markets themselves, and these mechanisms are not ͞natural͟ 
givens. It is therefore a mistake to conceive of the state, the market and society as opposing 
entities. One should turn instead to the institutionalist perspective, which draws from Polanyi, 
in order to offer a political approach to the state and the market. Economies are actually 
institutional production systems wherein the material density of the state both as organization 
and administration is of relevance. The institutionalist perspective thus needs to be fine-tuned 
in order to show that the state is more than a political-legal entity. That is one of the main 
goals of the present article.  
Keywords: state; political economy; institutionalism; institutions; market; state-market 
relation. 
 
I venture to think that modern economic life is seen much 
more clearly when [there is an] effort to see it whole. 
John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967: 7) 
 
 
Introduction 
When, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith speaks of the conditions 
under which we approve of the actions of others, he alludes to certain moral attributes, such 
as sympathy and solidarity, that are inherent in the consenting subject. But he also points 
out that the actions deserving moral approbation must be in accordance with ͞geŶeral rules͟ 
aŶd ǁith ͞a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the 
individual or of the society.͟ Then Smith goes on to explain that in that case what we have 
ďefore us is ͞a beauty […] not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine͟ 
(Smith, 2011: 291). 
We can say then that our relationship with others involves both our subjective motives 
(let us call them our identity) and circumstances resulting from those principles that 
transcend us as individuals (we will call them alterity). As was only to be expected, the 
author of The Wealth of Nations – where many found nothing but the cold mechanics of the 
division of labor and the principles of self-interest and incentive-driven action, seeing these 
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as a solid enough foundation for a market society – turns out to be deeper and more 
complex than some of his interpreters. 
My initial mention of a classic misconstrued by the liberal vulgate is not intended as a 
literal argument for discussing the contemporary problems posed by the state-market 
relation.
1
 It is however an argument intended to lay down some of the terms that no 
discussion of the complexity of collective life can afford to ignore. Most of all, it is a reminder 
of the fact that the mechanisms of action and decision are not unique, and that one should 
view them as plural and diverse.  
That is why I will adhere to the notion that there are problems that call for a holistic view, 
truly a whole philosophy of collective life that may serve as a frame of reference for 
understanding and bringing together processes of a diverse nature, which may prove hard to 
consider in a segmented fashion. Of course this is only to be expected when one is dealing 
with the state, given that the latter is essentially a political entity and given also that, for that 
same reason, it expresses in the ďroadest terŵs soĐietǇ͛s orgaŶization and historical course.  
In fact, in order to understand the state's underlying matrix we need a narrative of the 
relationship between the material and relational dynamics of society, on the one hand, and 
between these dynamics and the institutional dynamics on the other. At the same time, we 
need a view of the meaning of collective life beyond individual rationality and strictly self-
interested behavior. Besides, we have to see the state as the most complex institutional 
entity of all – I shall call it the institution-of-institutions – and as such it possesses a unique 
organizational density as well as a strong capacity to act back on the circumstances that 
shaped it and gave it meaning in the first place. Thus, one is bound to quickly find an intrinsic 
relationship between the state and the market, rather than the antinomy that often tends to 
be thrown our way.  
Efforts aimed at capturing complexity are epistemological in nature, in that they are 
predicated on knowledge and on the conditions under which it is produced. But they are 
also ontological (or thematic), in that they reflect on the whole question of being, on the life 
process and specific organization processes. Let me stress this point, because contemporary 
circumstances tend to strongly reinforce the interdependencies between epistemological 
discussion and ontological attention. The eŶorŵous ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of soĐietǇ͛s interactions is 
                                                 
1
 The present text is largely based on ideas already explored in Reis (2012). 
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indeed at odds with a segmented view of the social organization, thus making all too clear 
how flimsy partial perspectives tend to be.  
It is my contention that state and market ontologies are a particularly clear indication of 
that complexity, and that at the same time they strongly contribute to reinforce it, given the 
state͛s many important roles and functions as a result of the sharp acceleration of history in 
the 20th century.  
 While it is true that the theme of state and market is just one among many topics at our 
disposal for an approach that allows us to overcome dichotomies, it can be argued that this 
is a unique endeavor in that it also stems from a unique obstacle: the presence, in economic 
thinking, of a markedly ͞separatist͟ influence that regards the state, the market and society 
in general as opposite entities. Most often than not, this view borders on what I see as 
basically an ideological prejudice. This perspective conceives of the state as a ͞problem͟ vis-
à-vis society, while viewing the market as a ͞solution.͟ As is well known, this stance grants 
society and the market the status of favored or even exclusive sites for entrepreneurialism, 
dynamism and freedom, while all it expects from the state is a normalizing role, in other 
words, that it acts as a constraint on the creative spirit. This mindset is a powerful obstacle 
to a relational conception of the state, which is why the argument put forward in the 
present paper is two-fold. Simply put, one might say that one part of the argument focuses 
on social evolution, with more attention thus being paid to relations between social and 
economic evolution, on one hand, and the shape, place and role of the state, on the other. 
The other part gives emphasis to the nature of the state as an institution, linking this debate 
to the role conferred on institutions as shapers of economic and social dynamics. My 
ultimate goal is, of course, to highlight the relational perspective proffered in this paper.  
 
1. The liberal take: Too central a place in economic thought 
It goes without saying that a given concept of the state always entails a corresponding, 
symmetrical concept of markets – and vice-versa. The reduction of the debate to a simple 
duality is perhaps the first problem we encounter, because such a dyad is certainly not apt to 
lead to an adequate analysis of the complexity of the forms of governance in contemporary 
societies, where the state and the market exist side by side with other coordination 
mechanisms such as networks, communities, business hierarchies and associations. But for 
the present purposes, we can just assume that this is a minor issue.  
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Let us then start from that duality so as to get to the main debate and to the critique of 
the separatist perceptions of state-market relations. This is actually the context in which one 
ordinarily finds two basic – and rather disputable – positions concerning the place and role 
of markets. The first of these positions assumes that markets are morally neutral and that 
therefore they are a general device for resource allocation whose efficacy is to be assessed 
according to existing circumstances. The second is premised on the notion that markets are 
more than that: they are an essential, preeminent social mechanism, whose many virtues 
have manifested themselves over the course of history with civilizing effects, and currently 
serve as the foundation for the autonomy and freedom of individuals.  
Given their quasi-naturalistic character, markets (a synonym for the economy as a whole, 
according to this reductionist view) are the locus of depoliticized relations. As such, they get 
to define the economy. What lies beyond them is the realm of politics, an altogether 
separate sphere. Nevertheless, a significant reversal of the initial argument turned the 
market into the site from which everything must derive, politics included, with the further 
understanding that its ͞laws͟ shall determine social behaviors as well as the behavior of 
states. For this reason, we are currently living in a time when a powerful rhetoric of 
persuasion of this kind, now seemingly at its peak, seeks to contaminate every single human 
option and to advance the idea that it is social and political options as well as forms of 
organization that have to bow before the insurmountable restrictions posed by markets, 
rather than the other way around.  
Still, at the root of the most widely propagated views on state-market relations to be 
found in mainstream economic science there lies a contractualist notion that takes the 
ŵarket͛s natural virtues for granted and sees the state as an unnatural entity stemming from 
a strict delegation of powers by citizens. This is the liberal take, which rests on a theory of 
the state based on notions of property rights and transaction costs. According to this view, 
the state is essentially the product of a contract between legislator and constituent. 
Therefore, the constitution should limit itself to defining a framework of property rights, the 
role of the state being to enforce those rights while minimizing transaction costs.
2
 The 
citizens themselves are not in a position to enforce this goal, for they are aware of the 
radical uncertainty enveloping them as individuals. As a result, institutional choices are 
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 In other words, the social, political or regulatory arrangements required to attain the desired goals.  
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based on contractualism, which in turn derives from an estimation regarding uncertainty and 
the need to guard against it. Therefore, citizens establish constitutional authorizations, i.e., 
they grant a mandate whereby institutions take on a supervision or prevention role on 
behalf of those who feel unsure about controlling their future situation. There is then, at the 
outset, a founding act on the part of citizens, who decide to delegate authority to a supreme 
legislator, freedom and security being their reward (as they benefit from the economies of 
scale resulting from collective delegation): a decision on the part of citizens, who ͞abstain 
from all attention to […] personal wealth,͟ as Humboldt put it in 1792 (qtd. by Furubotn and 
Richter, 2001). The state is thus the product of a self-imposed agreement aimed at freeing 
the virtues of the market and society and also, through a strict containment of politics within 
the confines of the state, at defending the depoliticized nature of the market itself. 
Supposedly the separation of the two spheres would then be consummated.  
This initial liberal view, however, was soon ͞revised͟ to make way for another more 
mundane one, which saw the state-market relation as a relationship between ͞goodness͟ 
(or virtue) and ͞perversity͟ (or evil). In this light, the state, which had been born in purity by 
way of the initial contract, was soon to become an entity appropriated by rent-seeking, self-
seeking politicians and bureaucrats. As a consequence, it started acting and being perceived 
as an intensely ͞politicized͟ space rather than as the initial legislator. According to such a 
view, modern states turned out to be markedly prone to illegitimacy and to overstepping 
their role and attributions. Thus the state emerges as both a construct formed by individuals 
– who are aware of the limits allotted to them by their own uncertainty – and an agent that 
is plainly aware of its own interests, which it tends to replicate in spite of its creators. The 
state we eventually come to encounter in the theories is therefore neither a eunuch-state 
nor a benevolent, tolerant decision-maker. It is rather a wicked or perverse state, which 
soon evaded the grasp of the individuals who created it. The perversity of the state is the 
perversity of its agents, functionaries and politicians, who quickly find out that they can 
become rent-seekers.  
It is to public choice research
3
 that we owe a theory of bureaucracy. In addressing the 
basic question of how individual preferences that are necessarily different become 
                                                 
3
 ͞The most recent source of public choice theory can be traced to six now classic studies written by a number 
of economists and one political scientist in the late fifties and early sixties͟ (Pereira, 1997: 420). See Duncan 
Black (1958), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), Mancur Olson (1965), Kenneth Arrow (1951), 
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reconciled in political institutions, the research shifted its focus to the offer of public goods 
to formulate the theory, repeating ad nauseam the arguments on the autonomy of the 
state, its separateness from society and the cumulative divergence between social and state 
preferences. The mechanism of this divergence rests on the simple fact that officials and 
politicians turn their own preferences (their personal interest in power, which they seek to 
self-replicate) into policies, which is why the state is nothing but the ͞parallelogram͟ of its 
ageŶts͛ interests. In this light, for instance, social policies are perverse mechanisms that exist 
because they give the bureaucrats in charge of managing them the assurance that their 
posts and their status will remain untouched. The intrinsic aims of those policies do not 
much matter, then. There may be a good underlying idea to start with, which however is 
soon subverted and turned into perverse solutions. This notion has been aptly dissected in 
A. Hirschman's critique of the ͞rhetoriĐ of reaĐtioŶ͟ (1991).4   
A broader field than the one just described is that of constitutional economics (see Reis, 
2009: 95-117). Built on a solid theoretical basis, it represents a vision with an interest in 
politics (or rather in political processes, to be exact), in the state and in the fact that societies 
are organized around a complex, intricate institutional structure. But the focal points of 
constitutional economics are individuals and their downright subjective behavior. Here, too, 
neither the state nor politics are viewed as entities or circumstances that one is required to 
understand in a collective, historical or process-related manner. Interpreting the intricate 
relatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ life͛s complexity and institutional forms is not a problem 
constitutional economics deals with. The economic theory of constitutions on which it is 
based must be understood as a mere procedure for understanding how individual 
preferences can be ͞amalgamated͟ to generate collective results. At stake, again, is a 
contractualist notion, which seeks the ͞reasons for norms.͟ It is a notion built in the midst of 
a fierce debate at once against Keynesianism, against the maximizing paradigm and against 
the idea that there are external scales of value, exogenous to individuals, which constitute a 
pre-existing social pattern by which individual decisions are to be measured (e.g. a social 
utility function). The individualistic faith inherent in the constitutional reading is plainly 
                                                                                                                                                        
AnthoŶǇ DoǁŶs ;ϭ9ϱϳͿ aŶd Williaŵ ‘iker ;ϭ9ϲϮͿ. ͞These studies teŶd to ďe seeŶ as the fouŶdatioŶ of tǁo 
research programs that, despite their separate nature, have been linked ever since: public choice theory and 
social choice theory, the latter having followed an autonomous path in the wake of the work of K. Arrow and 
AŵartǇa “eŶ […] ǁhile ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg a Đlose relatioŶship ǁith puďliĐ ĐhoiĐe͟ ;ibidem). 
4
 See Reis and Nunes (1993). 
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manifest in the assumption that, ͞at least to a point and within certain limits,͟ individuals 
actually choose their own restrictions.5  
James M. Buchanan is a reference in this particular field.
6
 A founder of public choice 
theory, he laid out, in Constitutional Economics, an elegant, sophisticated construction of 
economic constitutionalism. There, the basic philosophical reasons behind his take-it-or-
leave-it argument are fully explained, but the elegance of the proposal is not lost on those 
who reject it. More than anybody else, Buchanan stated the firm belief, later turned into 
doctrine, that ͞the autonomous individual is not only presumed to exist; this individual is 
also presumed to be capable of choosing among alternatives in a sufficiently orderly manner 
as to allow a quality of rationality to be attributed to observed behavior͟ (Buchanan, 1991: 
15).  
But this view was soon turned into a trivial political economy of the welfare state.
7 This is 
because, prior to the most elaborate developments of a theory of the state, what we find is 
the argument that, in practice, any form of state to which an authorization has been given is 
eventually liable to violate and abuse it, as institutions responsible for managing transfers to 
citizens suffer from a ͞natural͟ tendency towards growth. Such an argument amounts 
mostly to a prejudice. The belief that institutions are incapable of respecting boundaries 
because it goes against the incentives of political activity is in fact one of the grounding 
notions of contractarians when they set out to reflect on the institutional sphere. The truth 
is that welfare policies are carried out by normal, ordinary politicians whose autonomous 
interests are not in line with, and in fact subvert, the goal of individual autonomy underlying 
the interactions that shape the economy as-an-order (which in turn leads to the 
ĐoŶtradiĐtioŶ that Ŷot all iŶdiǀiduals are… trulǇ iŶdiǀiduals after allͿ.  
                                                 
5
 AlterŶatiǀelǇ put, it is all aďout ͞ĐlosiŶg͟ the systems within which behaviors occur (Neves, 2004). Open 
systems exist when the restrictions that delimit decisions are perceived as exogenous, i.e., as coming from the 
outside. 
6
 This conservative economist who launched, as early as the 1950s, a fiercely anti-Keynesian, openly political 
university movement aimed at the study of the free society, is primarily known as one of the founders of the 
public choice school. The Nobel Prize for Economics that he was awarded in 1986 symbolized the consecration, 
by Stockholŵ, of the deĐade͛s academic neoliberalism. 
7
 BuchaŶaŶ͛s proposal regardiŶg the ͞disŵaŶtliŶg͟ of the welfare state is also extremely perplexing, illustrating 
the theorǇ's ͚ǁildest͛ facets. This is the case of the claim for the superiority of a form of organization of the 
economy that does not deal collectively with issues such as retirement pensions. Payment should then consist 
of a settlement of accounts with social security net contributors and net debtors, so as to reduce every single 
generation to a situation of equality and to abolish all management by the state, which is intertemporal by 
nature (Buchanan, 1986: 178-185).  
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These were the reasons why the liberal program soon moved from the notion of contract 
to the need to revise and restrict the initial contract itself. This, as is well known, is what the 
attempts to shrink and dismantle the state are all about, mainly with regard to the social 
state and its commitment to building policies for strengthening state-society relations.  
 
2. The institutionalist debate on the state: The notion of the market as a political construct  
The assumption that the state is the exclusive seat of politics, whereas the market and the 
economy are depoliticized entities, has been the object of severe criticism. One such critique 
and alternative view is that of Ha-Joon Chang (2001), who claims that the political approach 
should be applied to both the state and the market. The political dimension is surely bound 
to prove more relevant in the relationship between the two.  
Drawing from the pathbreaking work of, among others, Karl Polanyi, according to whom 
the ͞road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism͟ (1957: 140), Chang points to 
an approach centered on an institutionalist political economy that is capable of shedding 
light oŶ the ŵarket͛s institutional complexity and especially on the fact that markets are 
definitely political constructs, as opposed to natural states or givens on which the lives of 
individuals and communities are built. They are political constructs because property rights, 
along with the other rights defining the conditions of market participation, become artifacts 
that are established by way of power relations, of forms of legitimation and of legal, political 
and institutional arrangements without which they would not exist. From primitive capitalist 
accumulation to contemporary forms of privatization, they are truly the result of a ͞highly 
political exercise͟ (Chang, 2001: 11).  
Institutional complexity is also attested to by ͞the institutional diversity of capitalism,͟ 
that is, by the various forms of articulation between the state, the market and other 
institutions. Historically, the absence of a general rule or pattern is shown by the various 
forms of political mediation at the basis of a number of different models, such as the 
Bismarckian welfare state in Germany, FraŶĐe͛s post-war industrial state, or Asia's 
developmentalist states. The liberal proposals for depoliticizing the market and the economy 
are therefore ͞at best self-contradictory and at worst dishonest͟ (ibidem). By the same 
token, the post-communist transitions have fully laid bare the limits of simplistic views of the 
market. In the absence of a structured as well as structuring state, the market failed to 
RCCS Annual Review, 4, October 2012                                                                  The State and the Market: An Institutionalist and Relational Take 
 
94 
operate in a spontaneous manner, while there was clear evidence that the circulation of 
goods and services and the achievement of property rights took a perverse turn involving 
violence, corruption and the black market (Chang and Nolan, 1995; Stiglitz, 1999). 
Thus, when the studies on the ͞varieties of capitalism͟ emphasize the differences and 
specificities of certain models of development, they stress the fact that such differences 
stem from particular institutional designs, which is what determines the features of, say, 
͞market-coordinated͟ or ͞centrally coordinated͟ economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In fact, 
economies are institutional production systems (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997), which 
means that the pillars on which the workings of each of its particular forms rest (the financial 
system, the prevalent mode of corporate governance, business to business relations, 
industrial relations, the education and training systems, the organization of work, the state, 
or the innovation systems) take on certain particularities that extend to the relationships 
between them (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). Hence the notion that the roads to development 
require that the appropriate institutional arrangements be chosen (Rodrik, 2008). This might 
initially involve the right combinations of state and market, or, to be more exact, 
institutional arrangements that can be progressively deepened, leading to a reinvigoration of 
the economy and society, and which may even ͞defleĐt͟ the forces that push towards mere 
dilution in the world economy.  
The institutions that make up and surround the market are therefore as numerous as 
they are diverse. They can be either formal, like law or state regulation, or informal, as is the 
case of social conventions or cultural practices, but they can also be self-imposed norms, as 
exemplified by associations and networks. Consequently, the limitations (or even 
distortions) of the liberal view can only be overcome by abandoning their ͞ŵost ĐruĐial 
assumption,͟ namely individualistic self-sufficiency, and replacing it with a ͞more complex 
view of the interrelationship between motivation, behaviour and institutions͟ (Chang, 2001: 
18).  
In order to fully capture the meaning of this statement, suffice it to consider two crucial 
variables of the entire economy: wages and interest rates. Both ͞are politically determined 
to a very large degree. Wages are politically modified not simply by minimum wage 
legislation, but also by various regulations regarding union activities, labour standards, 
welfare entitlements and, most importantly, immigration control͟ (ibidem: 12).  
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Such a fundamental divide between politics and the economy makes little sense, then, for 
analyzing the framework within which contemporary societies operate. Neither is the state 
the stronghold of politics (and social elaborations), nor is the economy exclusively made up 
of the market, or a depoliticized entity that can be objectified in a set of ͞Ŷatural͟ 
relationships corresponding to the exchanges and transactions that make it possible. Thus 
the state is not necessarily an obstacle to the market, but rather, and most of all, one of the 
entities that make it feasible.  
Viewed in this light, the historical experiences of development, namely with regard to 
todaǇ͛s wealthier nations, show the vast occurrence of different forms of interventionism, 
thus disproving the liberal narrative according to which intervention should be kept to a 
ŵiŶiŵuŵ ďeĐause ͞the priĐing sǇsteŵ is aŶ effiĐieŶt ŵeĐhaŶisŵ of resourĐe alloĐatioŶ͟ and 
͞deǀelopŵeŶt ǁill come about naturally as long as the adequate conditions for private 
iŶǀestŵeŶt are iŶ plaĐe͟ ;Maŵede, ϮϬϬ9: ϭϳ9-180). Quite to the contrary, there are issues of 
large production scales which are needed to make static economies of scale possible and 
which demand high upfront investments. Also needed are larger markets or processes for 
making those ͞economies of scale more dynamic,͟ either through economies of learning or 
by ͞oǀerĐoŵiŶg produĐtioŶ ĐoordiŶatioŶ failures͟ – in a word, pretty much everything 
warrants state intervention (ibidem: 182-184).  
 
3. The complex gamut of roles played by the socially embedded state: Basis, action and 
trajectory  
The social use of the state is therefore not limited to an abstract, contractualist notion 
established by self-sufficient individuals bent on confining their action to a depoliticized 
reserve, be it called market or economy. The very fact that the market is a construct entails 
the existence of a dense institutional complexity that genetically connects it with the state. 
Besides, the state͛s role is not just a matter of oǀerĐoŵiŶg ͞ŵarket failures,͟ as the 
neoclassical theory sees it. Contrary to what Chang, in a sense, suggests, it also seems fair to 
say that the modern states of developed or developing capitalist societies do not have to be 
seen as strictly institutional entities, i.e., as entities that define essential political 
relationships, namely those that build the market and make it possible. Admittedly, Chang 
sees the state, first and foremost, as a participant in the construction of individual 
motivations: in line with institutionalist thinking, he ͞does not see these motivations as given 
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but as being fundamentally shaped by the institutions surrounding the individuals͟ ;ChaŶg, 
2001: 17). Consequently, his purpose – a very useful one at that – is to show ͞how an 
͚iŶstitutioŶalist͛ analysis of the relationship between motivation, behaviour and institutions 
may improve our thinking about the role of the state͟ ;ibidem). Still, one must agree that the 
state is more than that: it is a full-fledged, materially dense institution that makes its 
presence felt not only in political terms or in terms of the shaping of individual behaviors, 
but also at the economic and social level. It does not just define the feasibility of 
relationships in society, it is part and parcel of those relationships.  
Hence my suggestion is that, in order to correctly interpret the process of market 
construction, a distinction be made between the notion of institutional political construction 
;ŵǇ represeŶtatioŶ of ChaŶg͛s proposalͿ aŶd that of ŵaterial and relational political 
institution, based on a tight web of roles played by the state in both the economy and 
society. It is the purpose of my suggestion to capture the relationship between social 
dynamics and institutional arrangements. At the same time, it aims to stress the fact that 
institutions play a materially active role themselves, and therefore are not mere means of 
politically validating that which is spontaneously generated by society.  
As we can see, the role of the state in the economy and in society, together with its 
institutional significance, has a strong material density and is a product of historical 
evolution. Furthermore, that role is mostly the outcome of social tensions that need to be 
resolved either by agreement or compromise, and once the solution is achieved it becomes 
a new basis for subsequent social dynamics. In addition, although it is a product of historical 
dynamics, the role of the state forms a hierarchical relationship. Thus, the state is not just 
present in social or contractual interactions, it also shapes collective dynamics as well as 
defines a certain relational order, by way of the legitimacy it acquires and the power that 
defines it.  
The truth is that the modern state performs a complex range of actions, and for this 
reason its material role as a shaper of economies cannot be understood by merely 
emphasizing how markets are institutional political constructs that depend on the state͛s 
legal framework. The social uses of the state in this kind of society show the existence of a 
tight web of forms of action. The state establishes and sanctions certain hierarchical patterns 
of collective action (pursuant to what was said above with regard to economies of scale and 
of learning as well as production coordination), and defines and redefines the public and 
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private domains. This is done with recourse to a variety of roles not limited to the law, to 
regulatory instruments or to its political role, but also by means of substantive policies, both 
long-consolidated – such as the policies structuring the provision of education, health and 
social care services – and those that pertain to the modern structuring of societies – e.g. in 
areas such as urban space, mobility, science, and spatial planning and development. But 
given their dimension and shape, markets are related to and dependent on the substantive 
role played by the state, and not just on its strictly political function. Here we might resume 
our dialogue with Chang in order to take note of his analysis – albeit in a different context 
than the one addressed above – of the role of state-owned enterprises with regard to 
correcting market deficiencies and building long-term development relationships, especially 
in less developed countries (Chang, 2007).  
While it is true that the state͛s functions in terms of power and domination are 
historically dynamic and evolving, there are perhaps three aspects that illustrate the density 
of public actions, beside and beyond the strictly political arena within which the state-
market relationship has been described above. First of all, the state defines and consolidates 
collective infrastructures to ensure proper social functioning and innovation. This is arguably 
the foundation from which societies, economies and markets grow. Second – and on a level 
that is no longer fundamentally material in nature – the state, by virtue of principles that it 
itself promotes (such as the choice between puďliĐ or priǀate solutioŶs for soĐietǇ͛s 
problems) exerts an influence on the collective patterns of social and economic performance. 
This, in itself, evinces the presence of the state in, or its relationship with, the actual 
workings of society and the economy. Third and last, the state (even in its historical attempts 
to shrink to a minimal state) embodies strategic orientations, i.e., it plays an active role in 
shaping trajectories. In short, the state can be seen as an essential actor in the formation of 
a certain relational order, as well as the principal agent in the creation of externalities in the 
economy. While the latter role is commonly acknowledged, it also seems evident that the 
former, located somewhere between the state͛s material and political functions, is no less 
important.  
The centrality of the state in the economy is especially significant whenever it plays a 
major role in structuring the behavior of the social actors and the relationships between 
them. In truth, the public expenditure burden on the GDP and the entire range of economic 
means owned by the state are not the sole indicators of its importance, for the roles of the 
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state also include establishing contexts for action, setting meanings, and building consensus 
(Reis, 2001). There is thus an implied contractuality in the relations between the state and 
the economy, but this particular type of contractuality, which I term relational order, is 
radically different from the one underlying the liberal views critiqued above. Proof of this 
role of the state is not to be found in statistics, nor can it be arithmetically deduced, for it is 
intimately connected with an interpretation of relational dynamics. So for instance, when 
the need arises for creating a structure of social rights (such as trade union rights, 
employment rights, wage entitlements, welfare and health rights) or for enhancing the 
qualifications of future generations (namely with regard to education and training), one 
concludes that the state plays a fostering role which serves as a basis for development 
processes. The stabilization of macroeconomic variables, whenever necessary, is basically an 
exclusive attribute of the state, because when it comes to regulate external monetary 
relations, to ensure exchange capabilities, to take credit enhancement measures, to set up a 
framework for production and consumption, and even to safeguard productive capacity, it 
all takes place, more often than not, in the absence of strong – let alone autonomous and 
constructive – social partners.  
The state, therefore, is a generator of externalities.
8 The production of fixed social capital, 
of modern infrastructures, the development of skills and qualifications among the 
population, is quite a vast area in which the state materially fulfills its function. It is only 
understandable that this is the case in periods and under circumstances in which there are 
obstacles to the processes of social and political democratization, with not only social rights 
and human skills but also infrastructural modernization making that fixed social capital a 
pressing need. The former comprise health, education and training infrastructures. The 
latter includes mobility, urban well-being and personal well-being structures, as well as the 
material contexts for the functioning of businesses. One can only begin to imagine how 
decisive this role of the state has been in such periods.  
What makes state-society relations a predominantly relational issue is that, alongside the 
state͛s ͞autonomous͟ role, there are also diffuse social dynamics requiring an involvement 
on the part of the state. This relationship between a relatively diffuse dynamic evolution and 
                                                 
8
 In economic terms, a positive externality describes the production of advantages in a way that transcends the 
agents most directly associated with it and that benefits all the agents involved without it affecting the price 
system.  
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formal structuring strikes me as crucial for understanding the relationship between the state 
and society. J. K. Galbraith expressed in an original way the lines along which this dialectic 
operates. In The Affluent Society (1958), he discusses the processes and ǁaǇs ͞of oďtaiŶiŶg 
and then of maintaining a balance in the great flow of goods and services with which our 
wealth each year rewards us͟ (1998: 223). Alluding to progress and social evolution as a 
diffuse process, Galbraith deals mostly with the private production sector. But he does point 
out that ͞In the meantime, there are large ready-made needs for schools, hospitals, slum 
clearance and urban redevelopment, sanitation, parks, playgrounds, police and other 
pressing public services. Of these needs, almost no one must be persuaded͟ (ibidem). The 
basic tenet here is that ͞[f]ailure to keep public services in minimal relation to private 
production and use of goods is a cause of social disorder or impairs economic performance͟ 
(ibidem: 193).  
Still, oŶe Đould saǇ that Galďraith͛s iŶput serǀes to estaďlish the tǁo poles of the 
relational dynamics. That is why, contrary to those views that grant full sovereignty to the 
individual,
9
 he prefers – as he puts it in The New Industrial State – to analyze ͞a formidable 
apparatus of method and motivation causing its reversal͟ ;1968: 264). For that purpose he 
turŶs his atteŶtioŶ to the ͞teĐhŶostruĐture͟ that surrouŶds aŶd driǀes the large 
corporations, to ǁhose ͞Ŷeeds aŶd ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐes͟ markets, ͞far froŵ ďeiŶg the ĐoŶtrolliŶg 
power in the economy, were more and more accommodated͟ (ibidem: vii). It is clear that 
this ͞iŶdustrial state͟ aŵouŶts to a lot more than a political body: is a complex of tight 
relationships between the public and private spheres. In its size and substance, the private 
economy separates itself radically from the individual and from the normative conception of 
the market to take on an institutional character. Both in the process of generating the 
possibilities at the root of these circumstances and in the validation of their subsequent 
action, the borders delimiting the state and the market tend to blur and become porous.  
 
4. Reconsidering the problem in the face of a fundamental crisis  
The above considerations are all the more pressing in the face of the current crisis, which, 
given the nature of the break between economic domains and economic aggregates, I prefer 
to call a fundamental crisis. In fact, theoretical notions and ontologies of the state and the 
                                                 
9
 In this context, Galbraith problematizes the liďeral ŶotioŶ of ͞ĐoŶsuŵer soǀereigŶtǇ.͟ 
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market are not the only topics worthy of discussion and reflection. The powerful process 
ǁhereďǇ the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛s substantive relationships were reconfigured did more than just 
assign the markets a disproportionate role: it highlighted the redefinition of a number of 
categories that are vital for any discussion of the state-market relationship. It is actually the 
notion of economy, or economic system, that needs to be deeply grasped. This has always 
been the case, but it is not wrong to say that it has become more relevant in view of the 
turbulent circumstances the world has been facing since at least 2008, when the severity of 
the crisis became all too clear. Our questions about what constitutes the economy and about 
its goals should bring us to the idea that the economy is a system for the provision and use 
of goods and services and aimed at initiating processes conducive to the creation of well-
being and the improvement of human skills, both at the individual and collective level. So 
neither markets nor the economy are a simple, rule-free game involving assertion of 
interests, the interpretation of motives or the erratic doling out of either incentives or 
sanctions. If you have an individualistic understanding of the economy and see it in terms of 
competitive relations based on egotism and self-interest, you are likely to fare well with 
those narrow definitions of economic systems and even of economics that focus on a 
maximizing, normative concept of individual rationality and on reducing the entire range of 
social mechanisms for resource allocation and economic coordination to just one – to wit, 
the markets game.  
We are only too familiar with the tumultuous circumstances of these times of ours, 
brought about by the financialization of the world economy: the handing over of 
international financing and credit to liberalized markets and to speculation triggered a 
financial crisis which turned into a profound and predictably protracted economic crisis as 
soon as the turbulence hit the freewheeling banking system. It is nevertheless worth 
recalling, if only briefly, that at a deeper level we were – and still are – faced with two 
inescapable phenomena. One is the fact that the social function of credit and financing 
became radically disconnected from the economy and from the goals of wealth creation and 
promotion of individual and collective skills, favoring the autonomization of uncontrolled 
financial intermediation and speculation instead. What ought to be instrumental became the 
source of rules and assumed the power to rule.  
The second, perhaps deeper, phenomenon was a consequence of the actual disconnect of 
the economy vis-à-vis society. The economy, as defined above, has to be conc
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intimately connected to society. In other words, the economy cannot be oblivious to the 
plurality of individuals and organizations and to the cultural and institutional patterns 
established by them, nor can it ignore the compromises and goals resulting from the 
conflicts and agreements generated by human communities. But we know that this 
relationship was reversed when a normative, reductive view of the economy – as opposed to 
one where the economy and society coexist in a positive relationship – started to gain the 
upper hand.  
This dual process of ͞disengagement͟ was the cause of widespread instances of 
unsustainability which are no longer limited to the financial sector, as they touch upon the 
economic and social, not to mention environmental, domains as well. It does seem obvious 
that the whole framework for the movement and availability of capital has evaded both 
adequate forms of regulation and the judicious presence of a variety of mechanisms for 
allocating resources, with the ensuing weakening of the public sphere. Instead of that, we 
moved towards a single, totalizing and certainly totalitarian solution – that of ͞endless 
markets.͟ As João Rodrigues (2009: 57 ff.) says, the conversion of what Polanyi termed 
fictitious commodities (labor, nature, land and the monetary-financial system) into simple 
commodities ought to be considered as the deepest, most substantive process in the 
redefinition of the framework of contemporary economic relations, in that it undermined 
the notion of economy I described above and brought about a fundamental crisis in the 
relations that had led to the stabilization of capitalism as a production system over the last 
six decades. The most visible outcome of it all was the proliferation of turbulent situations in 
which irrationalities broke loose, inequalities were fostered, peripheries were consolidated 
and asymmetries were reinforced. All this, of course, was to be expected, given the social 
and economic ͞deconstruction͟ I already alluded to. The present crisis, in short, is the 
culmination of these processes and therefore it looms as a major factor in social and political 
unsustainability. At the center of this scenario we find the huge imbalances brought about 
by the financialization of the economy and by the imposition of economic behaviors and 
logics having little or nothing to do with production, with wealth creation and its fair 
distribution, and most of all with the inclusive logic of development.  
Therefore, if we say that the economy is a social system of provision and use, with wealth 
creation and individual and collective empowerment as its main goals, then the set of 
problems associated with the economy is bound to be different from the problems caused 
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by deregulated financial rationality. Also required is an adequate interpretation of all the 
phenomena and processes facing us, as well as a thorough understanding of state-market 
relations. This is why, incidentally, it seems clear that the problem of wealth creation and 
distribution has to be brought back to the forefront of the priorities of the economy and 
economic organization. What we are talking about here is development strategies, and by 
strategies I mean resolute choices, the convergence of actions and means, and putting the 
common interest first. I mean social processes that are at once complex, composite, 
concerted, in short, that require an all-round approach.  
One thing seems certain: nowadays, purely market mechanisms (͞the markets!͟ that 
obscure, quasi-divine entity one constantly hears being invoked in everyday economic 
parlance) are not enough to restore growth and well-being. Suffice it to recall the radical 
way in which the fierce, speculative and financial appropriation of the so-called market logic 
took place, and also, as Mirowski (2010) rightly observes, the main reason why markets 
suffer from an ͞inherent vice͟: the tendency to undermine themselves.  
This means that I think it appropriate, especially in the case of peripheral economies, to 
take topics that are illustrative of the need to reshape many of the state-society 
interrelations I have pointed out as important for the present discussion and put them on 
the agenda.  
It seems clear that such concerns point to similar concerns regarding the kind of 
economic knowledge so widely propagated and reproduced over the last decades. I am 
among those who believe that mainstream economic theory was one of the major active 
factors at the root of the present crisis, namely by reason of the market theory it promoted. 
This is tantamount to saying that the crisis carries with it an irresistible invitation to a return 
to the pluralism of economic conceptions, which cannot but be accompanied by judicious 
views of economic organization and of the mechanisms at our disposal for promoting 
coordination among its agents.  
That is why it is important to consider that the economy, in this sense of the word, does 
not have to do with the material and relational structures of markets, production and 
consumption alone, for it also encompasses institutions, decision cultures, behaviors, 
governance and the relational attitudes of economic and social actors (Reis, 2010: 227-232). 
In order to see how economic actors are coordinated and how the density of markets, state 
and community is formed, we need a broader economic paradigm than the one based on 
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market rationality. The state ͞calibrates͟ the market͛s weaknesses while also establishing its 
scope: thus, for instance, when a EU-based international system was established, the state 
began to function as an agent for the geographical containment of the market͛s relatioŶal 
capacity.  
 
5. To fully understand the material role of the state, an institutionalist theory of the state 
and of society is required  
In order to fully understand the role of the state, it is certainly imperative that we tacitly 
assume the evolutionary nature of its performance. The liberal state, the welfare state, the 
neoliberal state and the new social state are evolutionary forms whose matrix and reason 
for being can be found in the tensions (made up of conflict and consensus) determining the 
various levels of collective dynamics. We also need a comparative institutional analysis 
based on a ͞varieties of capitalism͟ approach. Both approaches will no doubt help clarify the 
necessary relationship between the historical materialization of each state form and the 
particular conditions of each country. At the center of the institutionalist perspective is the 
notion that individuals are empowered by institutions by way of the contexts, references 
and standards made available to them by said institutions.  
Whereas the historical nature of the state and of the roles it plays both in the economy 
and in society hardly needs to be emphasized, our perception of the ontology of the state is 
especially dependent on what we gather from the evolutionary view. I believe it is important 
to be aware of the fact that there is a clear parallel between the cumulative processes of 
material development, on the one hand, and the formation of the state as a structuring 
agent of those processes, on the other. Thus the configuration of the welfare state, for 
instance, cannot fail to be seen as strongly linked to the major phenomena which led to the 
transformation of capitalist societies that followed dynamic paths. Industrialization, wage 
relations, urbanization, or the development of redistributive mechanisms fostered by the 
growing collective capacity to generate wealth, have consolidated certain inescapable 
models of ͞progress͟ and defined non-reversible social standards. One could say that all this 
rests on mechanisms of a social or economic nature that are distinct from, and more 
powerful than, those of a political nature. In this sense, one could also concede that the 
nature of the state or its being termed as a social or welfare state is driven by material and 
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collective evolution itself, that is, by the dynamics of the structures that shape society and 
soĐietǇ͛s interactions. 
But it also seems clear – and this is what makes the state͛s relationship with the economy 
and society a complex one and brings to light the variety of phenomena involved in that 
relationship – that such a development of material life and social relations radically needs to 
be validated, consolidated and ͞formalized͟ from an institutional point of view. This, in turn, 
presupposes a role that only a structured, relatively autonomous entity like the state, with 
its legitimizing power and capacity, is in a position to provide. That is where the state͛s 
evolutionary nature shows it to be the institution that validates, legitimizes and instills 
cumulative meaning into that which society and the economy made possible through their 
own material and relational dynamics. Interrelationships and interdependence are therefore 
powerful.  
Any interdisciplinary analysis will have to pay special attention to the social uses of the 
state rather than to its transcendent nature. The role of the state in producing norms and 
rules, together with its legitimizing function and with the very fact that it is an organization, 
that is, a locus where knowledge and skills are accumulated, all go to show that the state 
defines contexts for action as well as forms of collective behavior and individual well-being, 
that it establishes tight, complex networks, and that it has a major impact in terms of non-
state decisions and in the definition of social goals. In fact, the state is the institution-of-
institutions. This makes it a highly material and relational entity, with an active role in 
processes whose boundaries are far from clear-cut.  
As stated at the outset, emphasizing a view of the state as political, autonomous and 
disconnected from society seems of little use for our present purposes. In fact, it will be 
easier to comprehend the nature of the state if we consider its social uses and its profound 
interrelationship with a number of areas that should not be misconstrued as autonomous. 
We have seen that the validation of evolutionary forms generated by society is one of those 
uses, and a particularly relevant one at that, once we acknowledge that we are facing 
processes of a progressive nature, both materially and socially. The function of the state as a 
producer of rules and norms is therefore no mere abstract defining trait. On the contrary, 
the relevance of institutions vis-à-vis societies is measured by their role in the structuring of 
social interactions.  
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Rules and norms, as well as implicit rules and, most of all, social norms are clear evidence 
of the state͛s iŶstitutioŶal role. Hodgson (2006: 2) views institutions as ͞systems of 
established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions,͟ while according to 
North (2005: 1) institutions are ͞iŶstitutioŶal ĐoŶstraiŶts͟ that ͞Đuŵulate through tiŵe͟ in 
suĐh a ǁaǇ that ͞the Đulture of a soĐietǇ is the Đuŵulatiǀe struĐture of rules aŶd Ŷorŵs ;aŶd 
ďeliefsͿ that ǁe iŶherit froŵ the past that shape our preseŶt aŶd iŶﬂueŶĐe our future.͟  
The institutional dimension or structure thus requires that the following three critical 
aspects be understood: the accumulation of values over long processes, their validation in a 
way that is both legitimate and legitimizing, and the multifarious nature of these values, 
which in turn makes them not just into norms but also into culture. IŶ suĐh a ĐoŶteǆt, oŶe͛s 
perception of the state can only stand to gain from a conceptualization of institutions in the 
terms just described.  
The normative dimension outlined above validates and establishes values, ideas, cultures 
– which is, first and foremost, what an institutional system is all about. This is why I have 
defined institutions as ͞collective consolidations of ways of understanding, of doing, and of 
organizing actions within society͟ (Reis, 2009: 20). Viewed in a broad, dynamic sense, certain 
institutions should also be regarded as entities endowed with a specific density as well as 
with a substantive weight and role in society, that is, as acting subjects. In addition to its 
consolidating and validating role as a legitimizing institution, the state is also a site of 
collective accumulation of knowledge and skills, and this is what delimits and characterizes it 
as an organization. The technical and organizational dimensions become especially relevant 
in functions such as those relating to administration, regulation, planning and supply. The 
technical state apparatus shows what else there is in the state besides its political nature. 
Such functions have to do with processes of intervention in the collective organization.  
One of the aspects of the historical dynamics that may best illustrate the institutional 
nature of economic and social development, and therefore the state-economy relationship, 
is the emergence of the wage society. It seems fair to say that the critical issue here was the 
transition of wages from a category embedded in relations of personal dependency to the 
ĐategorǇ of ͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ͟ ǀariaďle. While at that early stage labor markets functioned as highly 
asǇŵŵetriĐal ͞priǀate͟ ĐoŶteǆts, ǁith the adǀeŶt of iŶdustrial soĐietǇ the Ŷature of that 
variable was to change radically. Wages are then no longer seen as mere compensation for 
work, but start to be regarded as a core relationship, both economically and politically. The 
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dual nature of wages – at once cost and income – would soon be associated with another 
dimension, that of direct and indirect wages. The fact that it is a cost is indicative of a 
strengthening of the relationship between wages and productivity. The latter is directly 
linked not only to microeconomic and organizational conditions in the firm but also to 
competences and skills (e.g. education, health, mobility, being part of a network of social 
relations) that the worker did not get from his employer but are rather dependent on 
previous public decisions and on the assurance that collectively accessible forms of provision 
are in place. Apart from this relationship, which may be measured in microeconomic terms, 
the ability of enterprises to afford certain costs is also dependent on the contextual value of 
the goods or services they provide. That, in turn, is linked to the positive externalities they 
may benefit from – be they infrastructural, information, knowledge or merely contextual 
externalities.  
But what truly underscores the economic, public and collective nature of the relation on 
which wages are based is the fact that they are also an income, by means of which most 
citizens shape their own demand and affirm their belonging to society as a whole. Their 
impact and overall influence become macroeconomic and macrosocial, and of course 
political as well. This is primarily because ǁages are liŶked to a soĐietǇ͛s gloďal dǇŶaŵiĐs, 
from growth to well-being. This has to do with the fact that in such societies the wage 
relation does not limit itself to direct wages alone, that is, to the immediate monetary 
relationship between worker and employer. Aside from the fact that this relationship 
includes a contractual dimension involving rights and obligations (which in and of 
themselves also determine levels of indirect wages), what ultimately defines indirect wages 
are puďliĐ poliĐies aŶd the state͛s iŶterǀeŶtioŶ ǁith regard to its ĐitizeŶs͛ iŶĐoŵe, aŶ 
intervention based on the assumption that the labor market is a powerful mechanism for 
social inclusion.  
For these reasons, the wage relation went from being a private production-based 
economic relationship to being a social relationship of a public nature, on which, moreover, 
a new historical phase was founded, marked not just by industrialization and wage relations 
but also by urbanization, the advancement of knowledge and the centrality of collective 
organization.  
The economic constitutions of industrialized nations and the labor democracies that 
evolved in their midst until the abrupt wage deflation caused by the crisis that erupted in 
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2008 are but concrete manifestations of what has just been said. If we consider the 
relationship between direct and indirect wages, as well as each and every form of public 
policy relatiŶg to ǁorkers͛ ĐoŶditioŶs, we may rightly ask: how much is there of public policy 
in the retribution paid to wage earners? The transition of wages from a simple individual 
relationship to sector-based agreements and on to general wage norms and to minimum 
labor standards shows the presence of a number of different, if interconnected, processes.  
 
To conclude: Institutionalist and relational exercises on the state and the market (and the 
world’s turbulence)  
National differences notwithstanding, the role of the state in contemporary societies is the 
outcome of a long relational process. This process is marked by relevant social phenomena 
and by crucial problems regarding collective organization, as well as by the effect of the 
actual institutional solutions that establish and delimit the role of the state in each society. 
The political nature of the state and the institutional consolidation it entails are intimately 
linked to the logic of conflict and compromise inherent in social phenomena and social 
dynamics.  
Both fields – relational phenomenology and the institutional validation of solutions and 
forms of intervention – are indicative of questions that are intrinsically process-related and 
historical. Let us return to the examples submitted above with regard to urbanization and 
industrialization. What we have is collective circumstances for building social processes that 
are expressive of dimensions of material life which give rise to institutional configurations – 
in the present instance, of the state type. The place of collective processes in the overall 
social organization can be reconstructed from a great variety of points of departure. It is 
important, however, to correctly interpret the circumstances facing us in the real world. 
Reductive solutions will inevitably lead to problems of disciplinary consistency, as shown 
these days by economics. Indeed, by reducing itself to a discipline devoted to the study of 
markets, economics has critically undermined its scholarly nature as well as its ability to 
interpret social evolution, while also being responsible for ͞colonizing͟ the public sphere 
with controversial ideas. Hence the usefulness of an ͞indisciplinarǇ͟ ǀieǁ that brings us 
closer to social processes and phenomena in all their complexity and entirety.  
Translated by João Paulo Moreira 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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